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8.1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) among ﬁnancial institutions have
been accelerating over the last two decades across the world. These waves
of mergers and acquisitions in the banking industries raise important ques-
tions of whether mergers enhance the eﬃciency of surviving banks and
contribute to the stabilization of the banking sector or just increase their
market power in setting prices. A large number of studies attempt to re-
solve these questions by examining proﬁtability, cost eﬃciency, and market
performance of merger survivors. However, most of the existing studies ex-
amine the consolidation among the U.S. or European ﬁnancial institu-
tions, and little is known about the causes and consequences of ﬁnancial
consolidation outside the United States or Europe.
This chapter investigates the causes and consequences of the consolida-
tion among Japanese banks. In Japan, a variety of banks have been consol-
idated since the 1990s when most banks suﬀered from a huge amount of
nonperforming loans. The number of city banks, which operate nationwide
and internationally, remained at thirteen during the 1980s but decreased al-
most by half to seven in 2005. While the number of ﬁrst-tier regional banks,
which operate in one or a few prefectures, virtually did not change over the
last two decades (sixty-three in 1980 and sixty-four in 2005), the number of
second-tier regional banks, which are smaller than ﬁrst-tier regional banks
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to forty-eight in 2005. The number of cooperative (shinkin) banks, which are
deposit-taking cooperatives operating within a prefecture and specializing
in small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans, also dropped from 462
in 1980 to 301 in 2005.1
Using a rich data set of bank M&As in Japan, this chapter comprehen-
sively analyzes the causes and consequences of bank mergers in the fol-
lowing ways. First, we analyze motives of bank mergers as well as their con-
sequences. Using ex-ante bank characteristics, we investigate what type of
a bank was more likely to be a target or an acquirer. Looking at the post-
merger performance of a consolidated bank, we examine the eﬀects of
mergers on cost eﬃciency, proﬁtability, and healthiness. Though many pre-
ceding studies focus on proﬁtability and cost eﬃciency, it would be impor-
tant to examine whether bank consolidation improved bank healthiness, if
regulatory authorities promote bank consolidation to stabilize the bank-
ing system. We measure long-run postmerger performance based on ac-
counting ratios rather than stock market returns. Though market returns
are relatively free from measurement errors associated with accounting ra-
tios, analyzing them would severely reduce the sample size, given that a
small number of regional banks and no shinkin bank are publicly traded.
In addition, accounting ratios enable us to analyze important components
of performance (e.g., cost eﬃciency or market power).2 Finally, our obser-
vations are comprehensive. We use data of major banks (i.e., city banks,
trust banks, and long-term credit banks, which operate nationwide and in-
ternationally) and regional banks (i.e., ﬁrst-tier regional banks and second-
tier regional banks) over the period of ﬁscal years 1990 to 2004, and data of
shinkin banks over the period of ﬁscal years 1990 to 2002. Our sample uni-
verse accounts for more than 80 percent share of deposits in all the deposi-
tory institutions in Japan.3 During the period of ﬁscal years 1990 to 2004,
there were ten mergers by major banks, nine mergers by regional banks, and
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1. City banks and regional banks are both corporations licensed under Bank Law, while
shinkin banks are cooperatives of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) licensed un-
der Shinkin Bank Law. Regional banks are classiﬁed into ﬁrst-tier and second-tier regional
banks according to the associations they belong to. There are usually one relatively large ﬁrst-
tier regional bank and some relatively small second-tier regional banks in one prefecture.
2. We could analyze the impact of merger announcement on abnormal returns for the
mergers of listed major banks (e.g., Okada 2005). However, it would still be diﬃcult to ana-
lyze the long-run performance of stock returns even for the mergers of listed major banks be-
cause most of the consolidated major banking ﬁrms newly established holding companies
that owned the share of other ﬁnancial institutions (e.g., nonbanks, securities companies, and
credit card companies). For the pitfalls of using short-run responses of stock market prices to
merger announcement when mergers are a relatively new phenomenon, see Delong and De-
young (2007).
3. As of March 2001, for example, the share of deposits at city banks, ﬁrst-tier regional
banks, second-tier regional banks, and shinkin banks are 29.2 percent, 25.5 percent, 8.2 per-
cent, and 15.1 percent, respectively. Data source is the Bank of Japan Web site: http://
www.boj.or.jp.ninety-seven mergers and two transfers of business among shinkin banks,
besides the mergers and transfer of business from failed banks.4
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 brieﬂy reviews
the existing literature on bank mergers. Section 8.3 discusses the hypothe-
ses on the motivations of bank mergers. Section 8.4 analyzes the M&A
waves in Japan using aggregate data at the prefectural level. Section 8.5 de-
scribes our bank-level data set. Section 8.6 analyzes the motivation of bank
mergers using premerger bank characteristics data. Section 8.7 presents
the postmerger performance concerning proﬁtability, market power, cost
eﬃciency, healthiness, and portfolio. Section 8.8 concludes.
8.2 Literature Review
In the United States, a large number of commercial and savings banks
were taken over by other depository institutions during the 1980s, espe-
cially after restrictions on intrastate and interstate banking were removed
by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Eﬃciency Act of
1994. Recently, ﬁnancial conglomerates have emerged through a series of
M&As after restrictions on securities and insurance businesses by banks
were lifted by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Service Modernization
Act. In Europe, the emergence of the European Union in 1999 spurred con-
solidation of the ﬁnancial services industry. In the crisis-hit Asian countries,
foreign capital entry into the banking industry and government recapital-
ization promoted bank consolidation. These merger waves generated a vast
literature on bank M&As, especially for U.S. and European banks.
Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) review existing research concern-
ing the causes and consequences of the consolidation of the ﬁnancial ser-
vices industry. They point out that the evidence is consistent with increases
in market power, especially in the case of consolidation within the same
market (in-market M&As); improvements in proﬁt eﬃciency, and diversi-
ﬁcation of risks, but little or no cost eﬃciency improvement on average;
and potential costs to the ﬁnancial system from increases in systemic risk
or expansion of the ﬁnancial safety net.
As for the consolidation of banks in Japan, Okada (2005) studied ten
megamergers among city banks during 1989 to 2000 and found that no im-
provement in X-ineﬃciency was observed but increases in cumulative ex-
cess stock returns and decreases in perceived default probability were
found. Her results suggest that the motivation of megamergers was not to
improve eﬃciency but to take advantage of the government’s too-big-to-
fail policy. Yamori, Harimaya, and Kondo (2003) studied ﬁnancial holding
Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Causes and Consequences 267
4. No merger was conducted across diﬀerent types of banks during the sample period, and
there was one sale of business of a failed bank across bank types: the business of the failed city
bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, was sold to a regional bank, Hokuyo Bank, and a trust
bank, Chuo Trust Bank, in 1997.companies of regional banks and found that proﬁt eﬃciency tended to in-
crease when the market share in the region increased. Hosono, Sakai, and
Tsuru (2006) analyzed the motives and consequences of credit corporative
(shinkin) banks during the period of 1984 to 2002.5 Their major ﬁndings
are as follows. First, less proﬁtable and cost eﬃcient banks were more likely
to be an acquirer and a target. Second, acquiring banks improved cost eﬃ-
ciency but still deteriorated their capital-to-asset ratio after consolidation.
Finally, the consolidation of shinkin banks tended to improve proﬁtability
when the diﬀerence in the ex-ante proﬁtability between acquiring banks
and target banks were large. This chapter extends Hosono, Sakai, and
Tsuru (2006) to cover most Japanese banks, including city banks, ﬁrst-tier
regional banks, second-tier regional banks, and shinkin banks. Compared
with the preceding studies on the consolidation of Japanese banks, this
chapter comprehensively analyzes the causes and consequences of bank
mergers, as we mention in the introduction.
8.3 Hypotheses on the Motives of Bank Consolidation
This section reviews four major hypotheses on the motives of bank con-
solidation.
8.3.1 Improving Eﬃciency
As Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) point out, the primary motive
for consolidation would be maximizing the value of shares owned by exist-
ing shareholders. Banks can maximize value either by increasing their eﬃ-
ciency or by increasing their market power in setting prices. Cost eﬃciency
will be improved if an eﬃcient bank spreads its superior managerial skills
to an ineﬃcient bank by acquiring the latter. Proﬁtability will be enhanced
by superior risk management.
The eﬃciency improvement hypothesis suggests that an eﬃcient bank
tends to acquire or purchase the business of an ineﬃcient bank.
8.3.2 Strengthening Market Power
Market power can be strengthened if two or more banks operating in the
same market are consolidated and, consequently, the market becomes
more concentrated. Existing evidences from the U.S. bank M&As suggest
that in-market M&As, that is, M&As of banks operating in the same mar-
ket, may increase market power in setting prices.
According to this hypothesis, banks operating in the same region are
more likely to be consolidated. Actually, most of the M&As among regional
banks were conducted by banks operating in the same prefecture. Although
all of the M&As among corporative (shinkin) banks were also conducted by
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5. See also Yamori and Harimaya (2004) for the study of the mergers of shinkin banks.banks operating in the same prefecture, this fact does not necessarily imply
the market power motive but may simply reﬂect the regulatory restriction
under which shinkin banks are allowed to operate only in a region that is
usually deﬁned within a prefecture.
8.3.3 Taking Advantage of a Too-Big-to-Fail Policy
The government policy directly or indirectly aﬀects banks’ M&A deci-
sions. In particular, if regulatory authorities are expected to pursue a too-
big-to-fail policy, weak banks have a strong incentive to be consolidated
with each other because bank managers may want to keep their positions.
Bank shareholders can also gain from the value of deposit insurance by
surviving through mergers.
The government can promote bank consolidations among weak banks
in some ways. First, the government can “arrange” consolidations, per-
suading (or sometimes forcing) relatively healthy banks to acquire un-
healthy banks. Second, the government can give weak banks incentives to
be consolidated with each other by establishing a scheme for recapitalizing
consolidated banks.
In Japan, the government’s “arrangements” were sometimes used before
the 1980s when the ﬁnancial markets were heavily regulated, and even in
the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, as is known as the “convoy system” (see the next
section for details). The “market-based” consolidation through public
money injection has become an alternative tool since 1998 when the bank-
ing crisis culminated and the government ﬁrst recapitalized banks. When
Japanese authorities recapitalized banks ﬁrst in 1998, they did so toward
major banks and the two largest regional banks. This fact may have fos-
tered banks’ anticipation for bailouts as long as they were large. Not only
a large bank that operates nationwide, regional banks and corporative
(shinkin) banks that are relatively large in a prefecture may also have an-
ticipated bailouts because the Japanese regulatory authorities have often
worried about the stability of regional ﬁnancial systems, though the notion
of a regional systemic risk had not been stipulated until the Deposit Insur-
ance Act was revised in 2001 (Article 102).6
If the government’s anticipated too-big-to-fail policy and local market
stabilization policy aﬀect the decision of M&As, unhealthy banks or banks
recapitalized by the government tend to be consolidated with each other.
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6. For example, when the largest regional bank in Tochigi Prefecture, Ashikaga Bank, was
failing, the government temporarily nationalized it to avoid a regional systemic risk. Though
the government has not recapitalized shinkinbanks so far, this does not necessarily mean that
the government does not care about the stability of the local ﬁnancial market. It has not been
necessary for the government to recapitalize shinkin banks because the central ﬁnancial in-
stitution of shinkin banks, called Central Shinkin Bank, recapitalized member shinkin banks
when necessary.8.3.4 Managerial Empire Building
When corporate governance structures are weak, managers may be will-
ing to acquire other banks for the purpose of empire building. They may gain
personal ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial gains from consolidated institutions.
Managerial hubris may also drive bank mergers (Bliss and Rosen 2001).
Weak governance structures allow managers to spend on activities with
scope for generating managerial private beneﬁts, such as advertisement or
entertainment expenditures (Yafeh and Yosha 2003). Therefore, we may ex-
pect that banks that spend more on advertisement or entertainment tend to
acquire other banks. In addition, if the managerial empire building motive
drives M&As, then a consolidated bank cannot realize eﬃciency gains and is
not willing to downsize or restructure the business. Managers of consolidated
banks may increase advertisement expenditures for their private beneﬁts.
8.4 Bank Merger Wave in Japan
8.4.1 Overview
A very small number of mergers occurred in the banking industry until
the 1980s after World War II in Japan. The number of city banks, which op-
erate nationwide and internationally, had been thirteen until 1990.7 Merg-
ers among regional banks, which operate mainly within a prefecture, also
had been rare until the 1990s. Only one mutual bank (former second-tier
regional bank) was acquired in the 1970s, and two mutual banks were ac-
quired in the 1980s.8Mergers among credit corporative banks (shinkin) did
not occur frequently, either. A small number of mergers until the 1980s re-
ﬂected the government’s so-called convoy system policy.9Under this policy,
the regulatory authorities tried to stabilize the banking system by restrict-
ing competition among banks and bailing out failing banks. The govern-
ment restricted banks’ opening new branches and prohibited banks from
engaging in securities business to control competition. When a weak bank
fell into ﬁnancial distress, the government requested a healthy bank to res-
cue the weak bank by injecting capital and sending directors. Healthy
banks responded to the government’s request because they could obtain
the branch networks of the failing banks. Until the 1980s, M&As in the
banking industry occurred only when the government requested healthy
banks to acquire failing banks.
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7. Mitsui Bank acquired Taiyo Kobe in 1990.
8. Hirosaki Sogo Bank was acquired by Seiwa Bank in 1976. Takachiho Sogo Bank was ac-
quired by Nishinippon Sogo Bank in 1984. Heiwa Sogo Bank was acquired by Sumitomo
Bank in 1986.
9. For the details of the convoy system, see Hoshi and Kashyap (2001). For a typical ex-
ample, the Ministry of Finance asked Sumitomo Bank to acquire the failing Heiwa Sogo
Bank, and Sumitomo responded to it so as to obtain the branch network of Heiwa Sogo.As ﬁnancial liberalization made progress in the 1980s, the regulatory au-
thorities found it more and more diﬃcult to maintain the convoy system;
healthy banks had little incentive or capability to rescue failing banks. In
the early 1990s, stock prices and land prices fell sharply, which hit hard
banks’ asset quality. Risk-based capital requirements based on the Basel
capital standards, introduced in ﬁscal year 1992, spurred consolidation of
weak banks. Two mergers among city banks and three mergers among re-
gional banks occurred in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s (table 8.1).10 Mergers
among shinkin banks also occurred more frequently in the 1990s than be-
fore. Despite the introduction of the Basel capital standards, which were
supposed to be rule-based regulations, ﬁnancial regulations and supervi-
sions by the Ministry of Finance were still aﬀected by political pressure un-
til a banking crisis occurred in 1997.11
A banking crisis occurred in 1997, when three large ﬁnancial institu-
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10. Taiyo Kobe Bank was acquired by Mitsui Bank in 1990, and Saitama Bank was ac-
quired by Kyowa Bank in 1991.
11. The government’s resolutions of the failed “Jusen,” nonbank ﬁnance companies that
specialized in housing and real estate loans, were severely criticized by the public to the extent
that the government rescued agricultural cooperatives that had invested in Jusen and had a
strong political inﬂuence (see Hoshi and Kashyap 2001).
Table 8.1 Number of banks and number of mergers and acquisitions
Major banks Regional banks Shinkin banks
Sale of  Sale of  Sale of 
Total Merger business Total Merger business Total Merger business
1990 22 1 0 132 0 0 451 3 0
1991 21 1 0 132 1 0 440 3 0
1992 21 0 0 130 1 1 (1) 435 4 0
1993 21 0 0 129 1 0 428 5 0
1994 21 0 0 129 0 0 421 8 0
1995 21 0 0 129 0 1 (1) 416 4 0
1996 20 1 0 128 0 0 410 5 1
1997 19 0 1 (1) 126 0 1 (1) 401 8 0
1998 19 0 0 124 0 3 (3) 396 3 0
1999 19 0 0 123 0 1 (1) 386 5 (1) 1 (1)
2000 18 1 0 119 1 1 (1) 371 7 (2) 9 (8)
2001 15 3 0 117 0 0 349 11 (2) 5 (5)
2002 13 3 0 116 0 0 326 15 6 (6)
2003 13 0 0 110 2 0 306 14 0
2004 13 0 0 107 3 0 298 7 0
Total 276 10 1 (1) 1,851 9 8 (8) 5,834 102 (5) 22 (20)
Notes:Major banks include city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. Regional banks include
ﬁrst-tier regional banks and second-tier regional banks. The numbers in the parentheses denote the num-
bers of mergers or acquisitions of the business of a failed bank. No merger was implemented across bank
type during the sample period, and one sales of business of a failed bank was conducted across bank
types (in the case of the failure of a major bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in 1997).tions, including a city bank named Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, failed. In
1998, two long-term credit banks named the Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank failed. In response to the severe bank-
ing crisis, the Japanese regulatory authorities introduced prompt correc-
tive actions in 1998, applied stringent accounting standards in implement-
ing the Basel capital standards, and recapitalized banks to promote their
restructuring. The Financial Supervision Agency (FSA) was built and
took over ﬁnancial supervisions from the Ministry of Finance in 1998. The
FSA refrained from “arranging” mergers, not intervening in bank mergers
to rescue weak banks.
Major banks tried to survive through mergers, resulting in the merger
wave in the early 2000s. The Financial Rehabilitation Plan, released by
Takenaka, Minister of Financial Services Agency, in October 2002, forced
major banks to apply strict accounting standards and to reduce their non-
performing loan share to a half, urging weak banks to be consolidated.
Seven mergers among major banks occurred from ﬁscal year 2000 to ﬁs-
cal year 2002. Megabanks are now reorganized into three groups (Mizuho,
Mitsui-Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi-UFJ). The government also promoted
consolidation of regional banks and shinkinbanks. New legislation has en-
abled the government to recapitalize a consolidated bank since 2002.12 Six
mergers among regional banks occurred from ﬁscal year 2000 to ﬁscal year
2004. Mergers among shinkin banks also accelerated in the early 2000s
(table 8.1).
8.4.2 Empirical Analysis
We ﬁrst investigate the reasons for the recent merger wave using the
M&A ratios, that is, the numbers of M&As divided by the total number of
banks existing in the previous year, sorted by prefectures and bank types.
The hypotheses concerning the motives of bank mergers discussed in sec-
tion 8.3 have some implications concerning the time when and the space
where M&A waves occur.
First, if M&As are driven by the motivation for improving eﬃciency,
then merger waves result from shocks to an industry’s economic, techno-
logical, or regulatory environment (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin 1996).
These shocks lead to industry reorganization. Analyzing the U.S. indus-
trial merger waves in the 1980s and the 1990s, Harford (2005) found that
operational performances measured by return on assets (ROA), sales
growth, and others, were high prior to merger waves. He also found that
higher market valuations relaxed ﬁnancing constraints and made it easier
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12. The Special Measures Law for the Promotion of Financial Institutions Reorganization
was enacted in October, 2002. Under this law, the government recapitalized Kanto Tsukuba
Bank in September 2003. The Financial Function Reinforcement Law was enacted in April
2004 to enable the government to preemptively capitalize healthy regional and shinkinbanks.
Under this law, Kiyo Holdings and Howa Bank were recapitalized in 2006.to implement eﬃciency-driven M&As.13 Following Harford (2005), we use
the average ROA for each bank type to capture the economic shocks to the
industry’s operating environment and the stock price index for the bank-
ing industry to capture the degree of ﬁnancial constraints.
Second, if M&As are driven by the motivation for strengthening market
power, banks operating in a less-concentrated and more competitive mar-
ket are more willing to merge each other. Given that banks often compete
within a region, we use the Herﬁndahl index for the deposits of regional
banks and shinkin banks calculated for each prefecture.14
Third, if M&As are driven by the motivation for taking advantage of a
too-big-to-fail policy or a local market stabilization policy, then merger
waves occur when the overall bank health is deteriorated. To capture the
bank healthiness, we use the average capital-to-asset ratio for each bank
type. The change in the stock price index for the banking industry also
serves as a proxy for bank healthiness. Unlike the eﬃciency-motive hy-
pothesis, the hypothesis concerning a too-big-to-fail policy suggests that a
lower stock price triggers a bank merger. A low ROA may also lead to a
merger under the too-big-to-fail-policy hypothesis because a low ROA de-
teriorates bank health.
Finally, if M&As are driven by the managerial motives for private bene-
ﬁts, then M&As are more likely to occur when and where the average ex-
penditures for managerial private beneﬁts such as advertisement expendi-
tures or entertainment expenditures are high. While major banks and
regional banks disclose advertisement expenditures, shinkin banks do not
disclose the components of operational costs such as advertisement ex-
penditures. Therefore, we cannot test the managerial motives hypothesis
using the prefecture-level data here.
To control for regional shocks that aﬀect banks’ operating environment,
ﬁnancial constraints for M&As, and bank healthiness, we add the growth
rate of prefectural gross domestic product (GDP) to the explanatory vari-
ables.15 We also include a time dummy that takes the value of unity in and
after ﬁscal year 1998 and zero before ﬁscal year 1997 to capture the regu-
latory changes stated in the previous section. The estimation period is from
ﬁscal year 1990 to ﬁscal year 2004.
We estimate the following equation.
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13. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that stock market overvaluation promotes corporate
managers to acquire relatively undervalued ﬁrms. This “behavioral” hypothesis also suggests
that higher share prices cause merger waves. However, most of bank mergers in Japan have
not been carried out through tender oﬀers (take-over-bids) paying with stocks. So we do not
discuss the possibility of the behavioral hypothesis in detail in this paper. For the empirical
evidences of the “neoclassical” and “behavioral” hypothesis applied to Japanese nonﬁnancial
ﬁrms, see Arikawa and Miyajima (2007).
14. For the empirical evidences in Japan, see, for example, Kano and Tsutsui (2003).
15. Major banks had head oﬃces in Tokyo, Nagoya, Sapporo, or Osaka.(1) M&A Ratioi,j,t    1 Average Performancei,j,t 1
   3 Herﬁndahl Indexi,t 1    4 GDPGrowthi,t 1
   5 PostCrisisDummyt    6 PostCrisisDummyt
∗ Average Performancei,j,t 1   εi,j,t,
where indexes i, j, t, are a prefecture, a bank type, and a ﬁscal year, respec-
tively. Average Performance is either the average ROA, the average capital-
to-asset ratio calculated for each prefecture, or the change in the stock
price index for the banking industry. We do not enter those three variables
at a time because they are highly correlated. The Herﬁndahl Index is cal-
culated based on the shares of deposits of regional and shinkin banks in a
prefecture. Gross domestic product growth is the growth rate of the GDP
of the prefecture where the head oﬃce locates. Because GDP growth is
highly correlated with the stock price index, we do not enter them at the
same time. We allow for the change in the coeﬃcients of the bank perfor-
mance variables after the crisis using the interaction term of the postcrisis
dummy and the performance variables.
Table 8.2 reports the pooled-ordinary least squares (OLS) regression es-
timates of equation (1). Though we also estimate the model with a ﬁxed or
random prefectural eﬀect, we report the pooled-OLS model based on the
speciﬁcation tests. First, when the average ROA is included as a perfor-
mance measure (column [1]), the coeﬃcients on ROA and its interaction
term with the postcrisis dummy are both negative, though neither is sig-
niﬁcant. This is not consistent with the eﬃciency-driven hypothesis. Next,
looking at the case where the average capital-to-asset ratio is used (column
[2]), we see that the coeﬃcients on the capital-to-asset ratio and its interac-
tion term with the postcrisis dummy are both negative, though only the in-
teraction term is signiﬁcant. Finally, using the stock price index yields the
result (column [3]) that its coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant, while its
interaction term is positive but not signiﬁcant. These results suggest that
M&As tended to occur when the overall bank health was deteriorated,
consistent with the too-big-to-fail or stabilization policy hypothesis. The
coeﬃcients on the Herﬁndahl index are negative and signiﬁcant, regardless
of the bank performance measures, suggesting that M&As tended to oc-
cur where the market was less concentrated, which is consistent with the
market-power hypothesis. The coeﬃcients on the GDP growth are signiﬁ-
cantly negative, which is again consistent with the too-big-to-fail or the ﬁ-
nancial stabilization policy hypothesis. Finally, the postcrisis dummy is pos-
itive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that the regulatory changes triggered bank
consolidations.
We will examine the relevance of the four hypotheses concerning the 
motives of M&As more closely using bank-level data in the following sec-
tions.
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The data source of ﬁnancial statements of major banks and regional
banks is Nikkei Financial Quest and that of shinkin banks is Financial
Statements of Shinkin Banks in Japan, edited by Financial Book Consul-
tants, Ltd. (Kinyu tosho konsarutanto sha). We identify an acquirer if the
bank is legally surviving and a target if the bank has legally disappeared.
We focus on the M&As of surviving banks by excluding from our data set
the transfers of business from a failed bank because the latter is likely to be
conducted for diﬀerent motives and to have diﬀerent consequences.16 Our
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16. The transfer of business from a failed bank is identiﬁed if the deposit insurance made
ﬁnancial assistance (not recapitalization) to the bank that acquired or purchased the business
of another bank.
Table 8.2 Pooled OLS regression results for merger wave
1985–2004
(1) (2) (3)
Return of assets (ROA) –0.352
(0.628)




Postcrisis Dummy • Capital-to-Asset Ratio –0.450∗∗∗
(0.122)
Industrial Stock Price –0.008∗∗
(0.004)
Postcrisis Dummy • Industrial Stock Price 0.008
(0.015)
Herﬁndahl Index –1.625∗∗ –1.509∗∗ –2.077∗∗∗
(0.736) (0.740) (0.735)
GDP Growth –0.099∗∗ –0.109∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040)
Postcrisis Dummy 0.840∗∗∗ 3.214∗∗∗ 1.377∗∗∗
(0.324) (0.641) (0.365)
Cons 1.665∗∗∗ 1.668∗∗∗ 1.421∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.453) (0.313)
No. of observations 1,963 1,963 1,963
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.034 0.022
Notes: The dependent variable is the numbers of mergers and acquisitions divided by the to-
tal number of banks. Pooled OLS regression results are reported. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.data set covers the period of ﬁscal year 1990 to 2004 (i.e., from March 1991
to March 2005) for major and regional banks and ﬁscal year 1990 to 2002
(i.e., from March 1991 to March 2003) for shinkinbanks. For the details of
the variables we use, see the data appendix.
In Japan, ﬁnancial holding companies were allowed to be built since
1998 when the Antimonopoly Act was revised. Some consolidated banks,
especially major banks and large regional banks, took that opportunity to
form a ﬁnancial holding company that held insurance companies and non-
bank ﬁnancial companies as well since 2000. In the case of holding com-
panies, we use the ﬁnancial statements of the subsidiary banking compa-
nies. We do not use the stock prices of the ﬁnancial holding companies
because they reﬂect the performance of the other subsidiary companies as
well. By using the ﬁnancial statement of the subsidiary banking compa-
nies, we focus on the eﬀects of mergers on the banking company. If there is
a synergy eﬀect from the security companies to the banking company
within the same holding company, it is reﬂected by the ﬁnancial statement
of the banking company.
In the following analyses, we divide the sample banks into major banks
(city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks), regional banks (ﬁrst-
tier regional banks and second-tier regional banks), and shinkin banks for
the following reasons.17First, a shinkinbank is a cooperative depository in-
stitution specialized to small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) ﬁnance.
Therefore, the motives and consequences of M&As might be diﬀerent from
corporations like major banks and regional banks. Second, while major
banks operate nationwide, regional banks and shinkin banks operate
mainly within a prefecture. Most of the M&As among regional banks and
shinkin banks were conducted by those banks that operated within the
same prefecture (in-market merger).18 The eﬀects of mergers on market
power might be diﬀerent between major banks and regional or shinkin
banks. Third, regulatory authorities’ attitudes toward the nonperforming
loan problems were diﬀerent between major banks, on one hand, and re-
gional and shinkinbanks, on the other hand, in the late 1990s and the early
2000s. The government aimed at quickly reducing the nonperforming
loans of major banks, while the government, afraid from the adverse eﬀect
of the write-oﬀ of nonperforming loans on SME ﬁnance, did not force re-
gional and shinkin banks to reduce nonperforming loans quickly. Because
the number of mergers by major banks and regional banks are small (ten
276 Kaoru Hosono, Koji Sakai, and Kotaro Tsuru
17. Long-term credit banks are those banks that were established for the purpose of long-
term corporate ﬁnance and permitted to issue long-term bonds exclusively under Long-Term
Credit Bank Law. Though three long-term credit banks were established after WWII, two of
them (i.e., Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank) failed in 1998, and
one (i.e., Industrial Bank of Japan) was merged with city banks (Fuji Bank and Daiichi-
Kangyo Bank) and reorganized in 2002.
18. Among the M&As by regional banks or shinkin banks, only four (two M&As by re-
gional banks and two M&As by shinkin banks) were conducted across prefectural borders.and nine, respectively), separating them may yield relatively weak statisti-
cal results. However, we choose not to pool the major banks and regional
banks because of the preceding reasons.
Table 8.3 shows the descriptive sample statistics of the bank and market
characteristics that we use in the following analyses. We compare the bank
characteristics variables among the acquirers, targets, and the average of
each bank type: major banks, regional banks, and shinkinbanks. The vari-
ables of the acquirers and the targets are as of one year before the mergers.
Though we do not control for macroeconomic shocks across diﬀerent
years in table 8.3, it provides some useful information concerning the ex-
ante characteristics of acquires and targets.19 First, targets and acquirers
are less capitalized than the average of each bank type, and the diﬀerences
in the risk-based capital ratios are signiﬁcant in the case of the mergers of
regional banks and shinkin banks. Second, the acquirer tends to be larger
and the target tends to be smaller than the bank-type average, with the ex-
ception of the major banks’ targets, though the diﬀerences in the logarithm
of total assets are signiﬁcant only in the case of shinkin banks. Finally, in
the case of the M&As of shinkin banks, the targets’ ROA are signiﬁcantly
lower than the average.
Figures 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 compare some characteristics of acquirers and
targets as compared with the average of each bank type. We follow the fol-
lowing three-step process to draw the ﬁgures. First, observing the ﬁnancial
statements of the acquirer and the target for the ﬁve years preceding the
merger, we combine these statements to create pro forma ﬁnancial ratios
for a hypothetical combined bank. To calculate hypothetical premerger ﬁ-
nancial ratios, we calculate the weighted average of the acquirer and the
target, where the total assets of the acquirer and the target are used as a
weight.20 Second, we calculate the postmerger bank’s ﬁnancial ratios for
the actual combined bank using its ﬁnancial statements for ﬁve years after
the merger. Third, we normalize both the premerger and postmerger ﬁ-
nancial ratios of the acquirer and the combined bank, respectively, by sub-
tracting oﬀ the same-year, bank-type average.
Those banks whose data are available at the merger year and a premerger
year are included in the sample here. Similarly, those banks whose data are
available at the merger year and a postmerger year are included in the
sample here. In ﬁgures 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3, simple averages of bank charac-
teristics are depicted. Because we cannot compare accounting variables as
of the year of M&As with the premerger or postmerger periods, we just
Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Causes and Consequences 277
19. The diﬀerences in the interest rates on deposits and loans, in particular, seem to reﬂect
the fact that a large number of M&As occurred in the latter half of the 1990s, when Bank of
Japan conducted an extremely low interest rate policy.
20. If three or more banks merged, the series of the targets are a weighted sum of the tar-
gets, and the series of the hypothetical combined bank are a weighted sum of the targets and
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.connect a line for one year before M&As and one year after M&As. We
look at the ﬁnancial ratios that represent bank eﬃciency, market power,
healthiness, and portfolio.
Figure 8.1 depicts the premerger and postmerger ﬁnancial ratios of ma-
jor banks, suggesting some interesting facts. First, target banks were less
cost eﬃcient than the average, and consolidated banks’ ROA recovered
slowly from an immediate deterioration after mergers. Second, consoli-
dated banks increased the share of SME loans at least for the ﬁrst three
years after mergers. Third, the loan interest rate did not show a clear in-
creasing tendency. Fourth, poorly capitalized banks tended to be an ac-
quirer or a target, and consolidated banks suﬀered from decreasing capital
ratios and increasing nonperforming loans at least for three to four years
after mergers.21 Finally, both acquirers and targets spent less on advertise-
ment expenses before mergers, and consolidated banks continued to spend
less on them after mergers than the average.
Figure 8.2 depicts the premerger and postmerger bank characteristics of
regional banks. Like major banks, target banks were ineﬃcient and poorly
capitalized and proﬁtability and eﬃciency once deteriorated and then
slowly recovered after consolidation. The recovery of bank health, mea-
sured by capital ratios or nonperforming loans, after consolidation was also
slow. Unlike major banks, consolidated banks decreased the share of loans
to SMEs after mergers. Consolidated banks also decreased the advertise-
ment expenses after mergers from a relatively high level before mergers.
Figure 8.3 shows the premerger and postmerger bank characteristics of
shinkin banks. Like major banks and regional banks, target banks were in-
eﬃcient and unhealthy. The recovery of proﬁtability, cost eﬃciency, or
healthiness could not be seen clearly after M&As. Acquirers and targets
tended to focus on traditional loan business before M&As, and a consoli-
dated bank tended to focus more on loan business, unlike major banks. A
consolidated bank raised the loan interest rate after M&As.
In the following sections, we statistically examine how the premerger
bank characteristics aﬀected the M&A decision and how M&As changed
bank performance.
8.6 Ex-Ante Characteristics and the Decision of Consolidation
If eﬃciency improvement motives drive consolidation, relatively proﬁt-
able and eﬃcient banks would tend to acquire relatively unproﬁtable and
ineﬃcient banks in order to spread superior expertise and management
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21. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) deﬁned by Bank Law are the sum of loans to failed bor-
rowers, delinquent loans, loans delinquent for more than three months, and loans with the
terms alleviated, all classiﬁed by each loan. The NPLs deﬁned by the Financial Rehabilitation
Law are all the claimable assets other than the normal ones whose debtors have no ﬁnancial
problems, classiﬁed by debtors’ ﬁnancial conditions. Banks are required to disclose both
types of NPLs.Fig. 8.1 Premerger and postmerger performances of major banks
Notes: Period zero designates the year when the bank merger occurred. Negative periods de-
note premerger years, and positive periods denote postmerger years. We connect the period
(–1) value and period ( 1) value with a straight line. Weighted average denotes the hypothet-
ical premerger combined bank, calculated as a weighted average of the acquirer and the tar-
get with their total assets being used as weights.Fig. 8.1 (cont.)Fig. 8.2 Premerger and postmerger performances of regional banks
Notes: See notes to ﬁgure 8.1.skills over the target bank. On the other hand, if the government’s too-big-
to-fail policy or its motives of stabilizing the nationwide or local banking
system drive consolidation, relatively unhealthy banks tend to be consoli-
dated with each other. The government may also promote consolidations
through recapitalization. If managerial private incentive for empire build-
ing is a major motive for mergers, banks that spend more on private bene-
ﬁts like advertisement expenditures are more likely to acquire other banks.
To analyze the motives for consolidation, we estimate the multinomial
logit model:
Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Causes and Consequences 283
Fig. 8.2 (cont.)Fig. 8.3 Premerger and postmerger performances of shinkin banks
Notes: See notes to ﬁgure 8.1.(2) Pt,j   for j   1,2,3,
where Pt,j is the probability of the bank’s choosing the variable j at time t,
with j being an acquirer, a target, or neither. The explanatory variable vec-
tor Xt–1, j consists of bank proﬁtability, eﬃciency, healthiness, governmen-
tal recapitalization, managerial private beneﬁts, and size, as well as other
control variables including market concentration and macroeconomic
variables. We choose the ROA and the cost ratio for the eﬃciency variables
and the capital-to-asset ratio and the nonperforming loans as a proportion
of total loans as bank health measures. Nonperforming loans are available
only after 1998. We also use the yearly change in the stock prices as bank
health measures in the case of major banks, though the stock price data of
individual banks are available only up to 2001 because since then major
banks established holding companies whose subsidiaries include security
companies and nonbanks as well. The governmental recapitalization is
captured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank has
been recapitalized that year or before and zero otherwise. As a measure of
private beneﬁts, we use advertisement expenses as a proportion of total
cost. For the size variables, we use the logarithm of total assets and the




j 1exp(  Xt 1,j)
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Fig. 8.3 (cont.)growth rate of total assets. As a degree of market concentration, we use the
Herﬁndahl index for regional banks and shinkin banks. Though major
banks had head oﬃces in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, or Sapporo and had
some operational advantages over the areas where the head oﬃces were lo-
cated, they had branches and operated nationwide. This is why we do not
use the prefectural Herﬁndahl index in the case of major banks. We control
for the experience of M&As using a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the bank has experienced an M&A before and zero otherwise. A
bank that has experienced a M&A before may not want to carry out an-
other M&A if it takes a long time to consolidate information systems and
other business cultures. On the other hand, a bank that has experienced
M&As may have knowledge and skills how to eﬃciently integrate diﬀerent
business practices. In that case, the M&A experience dummy has a positive
eﬀect on the probability of being an acquirer. Finally, to control for indus-
trial or macroeconomic shocks, we add the change in the stock price index
for the banking industry and the growth rate of GDP in the case of major
banks and the growth rate of prefectural GDP in the case of regional and
shinkin banks. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
We checked the correlation among the explanatory variables and found
that ROA and the capital-to-asset ratio are strongly correlated for regional
banks and shinkinbanks (The correlation coeﬃcients are 0.045, 0.853, and
0.615 for major banks, regional banks, and shinkinbanks, respectively). To
check the robustness, we also estimate equation (2) by entering ROA and
the capital-to-asset ratio one by one into the explanatory variables. In ad-
dition, to take into consideration the possibility that it took more than one
year to prepare for mergers, we also present the estimation results in the
case of two-year lagged explanatory variables.22
We estimate equation (2) for each bank type: major banks, regional
banks, and shinkin banks. In addition to the full sample period (ﬁscal year
1990 to 2004), we divide the sample period into the precrisis period (ﬁscal
year 1990 to 1997) and the postcrisis (ﬁscal year 1998 to 2004). The regu-
latory authorities did not intervene in bank mergers to rescue weak banks
in the postcrisis period. Furthermore, their attitudes toward major banks’
nonperforming loan problems became much more severe in the postcrisis
period than in the precrisis period. It would be useful to see whether there
would be a diﬀerence in the motives of bank mergers between the pre- and
postcrisis periods.
8.6.1 Major Banks
Table 8.4 shows the estimation results for major banks. Column 
(1) shows the estimated coeﬃcients and column (2) shows the estimated
286 Kaoru Hosono, Koji Sakai, and Kotaro Tsuru
22. Two-year lagged dependent variables may be appropriate in case a bank that is to be
acquired by a relatively healthy bank in two years gambles on high-risk, high-return invest-
ment and ﬁnally deteriorates its balance sheet one year before mergers. This potential moral

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)marginal eﬀects for the full sample period.23 Looking at the results of the
acquirer equation, we see that the coeﬃcient on the governmental capital
injection dummy is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that those major
banks that had been recapitalized by the government were more likely to
be consolidated. This result is consistent with the too-big-to-fail policy or
stabilization policy hypothesis. It should be noted, however, that because
all the major banks were recapitalized by the government in 1998, the co-
eﬃcient on the governmental capital injection dummy may reﬂect any
structural changes after 1998. The other bank characteristics variables and
macroeconomic variables are not signiﬁcant. Turning to the target equa-
tion, we see that the coeﬃcient on the industrial stock price index is nega-
tive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that a bank was more likely to be acquired
when the equity values of the banking industry were deteriorated. These re-
sults are consistent with the too-big-to-fail policy or the stabilization pol-
icy hypothesis.
Entering ROA and the capital-to-asset ratio one by one into the ex-
planatory variables, we obtain similar results (shown in columns [3] to [6]),
though the coeﬃcient on the governmental capital injection dummy is pos-
itive and signiﬁcant in the target equation when only ROA is entered.
Columns (7) and (8) show the results when the changes in individual
banks’ stock prices are used as a bank health measure. We see that its co-
eﬃcient is not signiﬁcant in the acquirer or target equation. In the case of
major banks, the overall worsening of bank health and the government’s
response to a systemic risk may have driven the merger waves rather than
the individual bank health.
Using two-year lagged explanatory variables, we see (in columns [9] and
[10]) that no explanatory variable is signiﬁcant in the acquirer or the target
equation, except for the capital-to-asset ratio in the target equation that is
positive and signiﬁcant. Though this result is not consistent with the too-
big-to-fail policy hypothesis, the two-year lagged explanatory variable may
not be suitable in the case of the mergers of major banks because every ma-
jor bank seemed to hasten to choose the bank to consolidate or to be con-
solidated by, especially in the postcrisis period.
The subperiod estimation results are presented in columns (11) to (14).
While no premerger variable is signiﬁcant in the precrisis period, the co-
eﬃcient on the cost ratio is positive and signiﬁcant in the target equation
in the postcrisis period. The fact that a less cost-eﬃcient major bank
tended to be acquired by other banks in the postcrisis period is consistent
with the eﬃciency-improving hypothesis.
8.6.2 Regional Banks
Table 8.5shows the estimation results for regional banks. Looking at the
full sample period estimation result, we see that the coeﬃcients on the
Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Causes and Consequences 289





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.governmental capital injection dummy are positive and signiﬁcant in both
the acquirer and target equations, which supports the too-big-to-fail pol-
icy or stabilization policy hypothesis. In the target equation, the coeﬃcient
on the (logarithm of) asset is negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that a
smaller regional bank was more likely to be a target. These results hold
even if we enter ROA and capital-to-asset ratio one by one and if we use
two-lagged explanatory variables (columns [3] to [8]). Looking at the sub-
sample period estimation results (columns [9] to [12]), we see that no pre-
merger variable is signiﬁcant in the precrisis period. On the other hand, in
the postmerger period, the coeﬃcient on ROA is positive and signiﬁcant,
and the coeﬃcient on capital-to-asset ratio is negative and signiﬁcant in the
acquirer equation, while none is signiﬁcant in the target equation. The re-
sult for the acquirer equation in the postcrisis period is consistent both
with the eﬃciency-improving hypothesis and the too-big-to-fail policy or
stabilization policy hypothesis.
8.6.3 Shinkin Banks
Table 8.6 displays the estimation results for shinkin banks. We exclude
advertisement expenses from the explanatory variables because shinkin
banks do not disclose them. Looking at the full sample period estimation
result of the acquirer equation (columns [1] and [2]), we see that the coeﬃ-
cients on the (logarithm of) asset and the M&A experience dummy are
positive and signiﬁcant. A larger shinkin bank is more likely to acquire
another shinkin bank. In the target equation, the coeﬃcient on ROA is 
positive and signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient on the cost ratio is negative 
and signiﬁcant. Eﬃcient shinkin banks tended to be a target, though the
eﬃciency-improving hypothesis posits that eﬃcient banks tend to be an 
acquirer. The coeﬃcient on the capital-to-asset ratio is negative and signif-
icant, which is consistent with the too-big-to-fail or stabilization policy.
The coeﬃcient on the Herﬁndahl index is negative and signiﬁcant, sug-
gesting that a shinkin bank tends to be consolidated if it operates in a less-
concentrated market, which is consistent with the market power hypothe-
sis. The coeﬃcients on the (logarithm of) asset and the asset growth are
both negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that a small or slowly growing
shinkin bank tended to be a target.
Most of these results still hold even if we enter ROA and the capital-to-
asset ratio separately (columns [3] to [6]) or if we use two-year lagged ex-
planatory variables (columns [7] and [8]), though the coeﬃcients on ROA
and the capital-to-asset ratio become insigniﬁcant in the target equation
when we enter them separately.
Though the subsample period estimation results yield similar results
both in the premerger and postmerger periods, it is notable that the coeﬃ-
cient on the capital-to-asset ratio is negative and signiﬁcant in the target
equation only in the postcrisis period, suggesting that the too-big-to-fail or
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)stabilization policy hypothesis is valid in the postcrisis period. The coeﬃ-
cient on the nonperforming loan ratio is also positive and signiﬁcant in the
target equation in the postcrisis period. The evidences on the eﬀects of the
premerger bank eﬃciency on the likelihood of being a target are mixed; the
signs of the coeﬃcients on ROA change from negative in the precrisis pe-
riod to positive in the postcrisis period, and the coeﬃcient on the cost ra-
tio is negative and signiﬁcant in the precrisis period.
In sum, the eﬃciency-improving hypothesis seems to be valid in the case
of the postcrisis period’s consolidations among major banks and among
regional banks. The market power hypothesis seems to be valid in the case
of the consolidations among shinkin banks. The government’s too-big-to-
fail or ﬁnancial stabilization policy hypothesis also seems to be valid, es-
pecially in the case of the postcrisis period’s consolidations. We ﬁnd no ev-
idence that supports the managerial empire-building hypothesis, though
we cannot test that hypothesis in the case of the consolidations among
shinkin banks due to the lack of suitable data.
8.7 Postmerger Performance
8.7.1 Background
Consolidation may have various eﬀects on the consolidated bank’s eﬃ-
ciency, market power, services provided, healthiness, and expenses for
managerial private beneﬁts.
First, consolidation may increase or decrease eﬃciency in various ways.
A consolidated bank may be able to achieve a scale or scope economy. It
may also improve X-eﬃciency by spreading superior acquirers’ managerial
skills over targets. On the other hand, it may take considerable time and
costs to integrate diﬀerent accounting and information systems, ways of
doing business, and corporate cultures.
Second, consolidation may change the availability of loans and other ﬁ-
nancial services to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), though
such changes may not be intended either by acquirers or targets. If consol-
idation improves eﬃciency, a more eﬃcient consolidated bank may be able
to serve more customers, including SMEs. On the other hand, if a large
bank ﬁnds it costly to process relationship-based information due to its 
organizational complexity, a consolidated bank may reduce loans to the
SMEs that are informationally opaque (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan
1999). Consolidated banks may also increase or reduce other services, in-
cluding fee businesses, according to their comparative advantages.
Third, consolidation may strengthen market power, enabling the consol-
idated bank to raise loan interest rates or lower deposit interest rates. This
is likely to occur when acquirers and targets operate within the same local
market (e.g., Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 1999).
Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Causes and Consequences 295Fourth, consolidation may improve or deteriorate healthiness. Although
regulators may promote consolidations by weak banks, it is not clear
whether weak banks can restore healthiness just through consolidation.
On one hand, a consolidated bank may gain from risk diversiﬁcation
through investing various areas and industries (Berger, Demsetz, and Stra-
han 1999). In addition, an acquirer may apply its superior risk manage-
ment skills to a target. However, if poorly-capitalized banks are consoli-
dated, a consolidated bank must be highly proﬁtable to ﬁll in the initial
shortage of capital and then to recover its capital to a normal level, unless
it raises capital from outside. In addition, a consolidated bank may be ex-
posed to the risk of an unproportionally large amount of loans to some
speciﬁc large borrowers as compared with other banks as a result of the
consolidation.24
Finally, consolidation may increase or decrease expenses for the purpose
of managerial private beneﬁts, like advertisement expenses. If a bank ac-
quires another bank for the purpose of increasing private beneﬁts, a con-
solidated bank may increase expenses for private beneﬁts. On the other
hand, if a bank becomes a target due to its weak governance structures that
allow large amounts of spending for private beneﬁts, a consolidated bank
may decrease such spending.
8.7.2 Methodology
We investigate the consequences of M&As by comparing the bank ﬁ-
nancial variables of premerger and postmerger periods.25 From the view-
point of existing shareholders (or members of shinkin banks) of acquirers,
it is natural to compare premerger acquiring banks and postmerger con-
solidated banks. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of regulators that
care about the banking system, it is useful to compare hypothetical pre-
merger combined banks (that is, a weighted average of an acquirer and a
target) and postmerger consolidated banks. We perform both compar-
isons.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst construct the ﬁnancial ratios of the premerger hy-
pothetical combined bank and the postmerger consolidated bank in the
same way as we depicted in ﬁgures 8.1 through 8.3. Note that we normal-
ize all the premerger and postmerger ﬁnancial ratios by subtracting oﬀ the
same-year, bank-type average. Next, we take the premerger average of the
hypothetical combined bank over the ﬁve years before mergers. If the pre-
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24. The following example may be useful. Tokai Bank, Sanwa Bank, Fuji Bank, and Sum-
itomo Bank each had almost equal amounts (more than 500 billion yen) of loans outstanding
to a large retail company, Daiei, which was in ﬁnancial distress. It is said that UFJ Bank,
formed from the consolidation of Tokai Bank and Sanwa Bank, was saddled with a distin-
guished amount (more than one trillion yen) of loans to Daiei for a long time after the con-
solidation.
25. The approach here is similar to Delong and Deyoung (2007).merger data are available for less than ﬁve years, we take the premerger av-
erage over the maximum years for which we can observe the data. Finally,
we take the diﬀerence between the normalized premerger bank ﬁnancial
ratios and the normalized postmerger bank ﬁnancial ratios. We look at the
changes of the bank ﬁnancial ratios for one to ﬁve years after mergers, re-
spectively, though we report in tables 8.7, 8.8, and 8.9 only three and ﬁve
years after mergers to save space. Focarelli and Panetta (2003), Focarelli
and Pozzolo (2005), and Rhoades (1998) show that a two- to three-year
postmerger period is needed to determine if there are any postmerger gains.
We also take the average of the postmerger ﬁnancial ratios of the consoli-
dated bank over the (at most) ﬁve years after mergers and take the diﬀer-
ence between the premerger ﬁve-year average and the postmerger ﬁve-year
average.
We perform the t-test for the null hypothesis so that the diﬀerence be-
tween a normalized premerger ﬁnancial ratio and a normalized post-
merger ﬁnancial ratio has mean zero. We also performed the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test (z-statistic) for the null hypothesis so that the diﬀerence
between them has median zero and obtained qualitatively similar results
for most ﬁnancial ratios. So we mainly report the t-test results in the fol-
lowing.
In this section, we select a sample where data on bank ﬁnancial ratios are
available for the merger year, one or more premerger years, and one or
more postmerger years. The data set here is slightly diﬀerent from that used
in ﬁgures 8.1 through 8.3, where we choose sample banks whose data were
available for the merger year and one or more premerger years but not nec-
essarily available for postmerger years and sample banks whose data were
available for the merger year and one or more postmerger years but not
necessarily available for premerger years.
8.7.3 Results
Major Banks
Table 8.7 shows the changes in the ﬁnancial ratios of the consolidated
major banks. The ﬁrst column shows the changes from the hypothetical
premerger combined bank for the full sample period.
Looking at the eﬃciency variables, we see that the changes in ROA are
negative three years after mergers and then turn to positive ﬁve years after
mergers, though none of the changes is signiﬁcant. The changes in the cost
ratio are not signiﬁcant, either, though consolidated banks seem to have
decreased the cost ratio. It seems to take considerable time for a consoli-
dated bank to realize cost savings or gain economies of scale or scope.
Market power variables show that the changes in the average deposit in-
terest rate and the changes in the loan interest rate are not signiﬁcant. A
consolidated major bank did not seem to be able to exert market power in
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Premerger
Premerger combined bank acquirer
Change from: 1990–2004 1990–1997 1998–2004 1990–2004
Return of assets (ROA)
 ROA (3-year postmerger) –0.200 –0.212
 ROA (5-year postmerger) 0.149 0.125
 ROA (postmerger average) –0.219 0.150 –0.377 –0.230
Cost Ratio
 Cost Ratio (3-year postmerger) –0.015 –0.054
 Cost Ratio (5-year postmerger) –0.058 –0.124
 Cost Ratio (postmerger average) –0.018 0.015 –0.033 –0.058
Fees and Commissions
 Fees and Commissions (3-year postmerger) 0.079 –0.032
 Fees and Commissions (5-year postmerger) 0.110 0.048
 Fees and Commissions (postmerger average) 0.006 0.065 –0.024 –0.029
Loan-to-Asset Ratio
 Loan-to-Asset Ratio (3-year postmerger) –0.235 –0.398
 Loan-to-Asset Ratio (5-year postmerger) 2.498 1.817
 Loan-to-Asset Ratio (postmerger average) –1.037 0.580 –1.730 –1.200
Loans to SMEs
 Loans to SMEs (3-year postmerger) 1.700b –1.850
 Loans to SMEs (5-year postmerger) –0.384 –4.909
 Loans to SMEs (postmerger average) 1.727b∗∗ 1.064b 2.390 –2.047
Loan Growth Rate
 Loan Growth Rate (3-year postmerger) –2.760 –3.784
 Loan Growth Rate (5-year postmerger) –4.478 –6.387
 Loan Growth Rate (postmerger average) –3.058b∗∗ 0.014 –4.375a∗∗ –4.082b∗∗
Deposit Interest Rate
 Deposit Interest Rate (3-year postmerger) 0.008 0.114
 Deposit Interest Rate (5-year postmerger) –0.354 –0.249
 Deposit Interest Rate (postmerger average) –0.058 0.023 –0.093 0.048
Loan Interest Rate
 Loan Interest Rate (3-year postmerger) 0.062 0.075
 Loan Interest Rate (5-year postmerger) –0.057 –0.010
 Loan Interest Rate (postmerger average) –0.001 0.167 –0.073 0.012
Capital-to-Asset Ratio
 Capital-to-Asset Ratio (3-year postmerger) –1.319a∗∗ –1.342a∗∗
 Capital-to-Asset Ratio (5-year postmerger) –0.509 –0.498
 Capital-to-Asset Ratio (postmerger average) –1.158a∗∗∗ –0.432 –1.470a∗∗ –1.181a∗∗∗
Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS)
 Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) 
(3-year postmerger) –2.108b –1.788b
 Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) 
(5-year postmerger)
 Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) 
(postmerger average) –1.376 –1.376 –1.104
Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL)
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL) 
(3-year postmerger) 4.118b 4.301a∗∗the deposit or loan market. This is not surprising, given that both acquir-
ing major banks and target major banks operated nationwide.
Business scope variables suggest that the share of SME loans signiﬁ-
cantly increases three years after mergers. One possible reason is that ac-
quirers may have spread the skills necessary to make SME loans to targets.
However, more a plausible reason is that when the government recapital-
ized banks, it required banks to increase SME loans. Because banks tended
to be consolidated after the government recapitalization, consolidated
banks increased SME loans. This result is diﬀerent from U.S. bank merger
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 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL) 
(5-year postmerger)
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL) 
(postmerger average) 3.697b 3.697b 3.880b∗∗
Nonperforming Loan Ratio (FRL)
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (FRL) 
(3-year postmerger) 3.589b 3.835b∗∗
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (FRL) 
(5-year postmerger)
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (FRL) 
(postmerger average) 3.202 3.202 3.448b∗∗
Advertisement Expenses
 Advertisement Expenses (3-year postmerger) –0.268 –0.339
 Advertisement Expenses (5-year postmerger) 0.243 0.038
 Advertisement Expenses (postmerger average) –0.164 0.240 –0.337 –0.234
Asset Growth
 Asset Growth (3-year postmerger) –3.450 –4.497
 Asset Growth (5-year postmerger) –3.891 –5.557
 Asset Growth (postmerger average) –2.617 1.973 –4.585a∗∗ –3.665
Notes: The columns under the heading of “Premerger combined bank” denote the average change from
the premerger hypothetical combined bank that is a weighted average of an acquirer and a target. The
column under the heading of “Premerger acquirer” denotes the average changes from the premerger ac-
quirer.  X (t-year postmerger) is the diﬀerence of the variable X between t-year postmerger and the pre-
merger average over ﬁve years (or less if data is not available).  X (postmerger average) is the diﬀerence
between X(postmerger average) and X(premerger average), where X(postmerger average) is the post-
merger average of the variable Xover ﬁve years (or less if data is not available) and X(premerger average)
is the premerger average of the variable X over ﬁve years (or less if data not available).
aSigniﬁcant at the 1 percent level for the null hypothesis that  X (or X) has zero mean.
bSigniﬁcant at the 5 percent level for the null hypothesis that  X (or X) has zero mean.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis that  X(or
X) has median zero.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis that  X (or
X) has median zero.
Table 8.7 (continued)
Premerger
Premerger combined bank acquirer
Change from: 1990–2004 1990–1997 1998–2004 1990–2004evidences, especially for the mergers of large banks (Berger, Demsetz, and
Strahan 1999, 170). The changes in fees and commissions and in the loan-
to-asset ratio are not signiﬁcant.
Bank health measures suggest that the changes in the capital-to-asset ra-
tios are negative and signiﬁcant three years after mergers and the changes
in the risk-based Bank for International Settlements (BIS) capital ratios
are also negative and signiﬁcant (for t-statistics) for three years after merg-
ers. The improvement of ROA after the merger was not quick or suﬃcient
enough to oﬀset the initial gap of the capital ratios between consolidated
banks (i.e., acquirers and targets) and their peers. In addition, the changes
in the nonperforming loan ratios, based either on Bank Law or the Finan-
cial Rehabilitation Act, are positive and signiﬁcant three years after merg-
ers. Consolidated banks may have applied a stricter standard to recognize
nonperforming loans than before, resulting in the increase in disclosed
nonperforming loans. It is well known that Japanese banks often manipu-
lated the amounts of disclosed nonperforming loans so that they could sat-
isfy the Basel capital standards before the Financial Rehabilitation Plan
(i.e., Takenaka Plan) in 2002. In addition, a consolidated bank may have
been exposed to the risk of an unproportionally large amount of loans to
some speciﬁc large borrowers as a result of the consolidation. When those
borrowers fell in ﬁnancial distress, the consolidated bank may have con-
tinued to lend to them in order to avoid their failures, which would cause a
sharp decrease in the bank’s own capital.26
Finally, private beneﬁt variables suggest that the change in the adver-
tisement expenses as a proportion of total assets is not signiﬁcant. The con-
solidated bank did not signiﬁcantly increase advertisement expenses. In
addition, the change in the average loan growth rate over the postmerger
ﬁve years is signiﬁcantly negative. The change in the average asset growth
rate is also negative, though not signiﬁcant. These results suggest that
mergers triggered asset restructuring. Considering these results together,
we may say that no evidence is found that supports the managerial empire
building hypothesis.
The second and third columns of table 8.7 report the changes in the post-
merger performance from the hypothesized premerger combined bank for
the subperiods of the precrisis period (ﬁscal year 1990 to 1997) and the
postcrisis period (ﬁscal year 1998 to 2004), respectively. In the premerger
period, the change in the share of SME loans is signiﬁcantly positive. On
the other hand, in the postmerger period, the changes in the loan growth
rate, the asset growth rate, and the capital ratio are signiﬁcantly negative,
and the change in the nonperforming loan ratio based on the Bank Law is
signiﬁcantly positive. The mergers in the postmerger crisis period seem to
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26. Such a behavior is called “ever-greening” (Peek and Rosengren 2005) or “zombie lend-
ing” (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 2006).have been more directed to asset restructuring and yet to have resulted in
a worse bank health, though the long-run eﬀects of the mergers in the early
2000s may not have been realized yet.
The last column of table 8.7 shows the changes of the performance of
consolidated banks from the premerger acquirer’s level for the full sample
period. Most of the changes from the premerger acquirer’s level are quali-
tatively the same as the changes from the premerger hypothetical combined
bank, except that the changes in the share of SME loans is not signiﬁcant,
reﬂecting the fact that the premerger acquirer’s share of SME loans was
higher than the average of major banks.
Regional Banks
Table 8.8shows the changes in the ﬁnancial ratios of the consolidated re-
gional banks. The ﬁrst column shows the changes from the premerger hy-
pothetical combined bank for the full sample period. Like major banks,
the changes in ROA are negative, though not signiﬁcant, three years after
mergers and then turn to be positive and signiﬁcant (for t-statistics) ﬁve
years after mergers. This increase in ROA is caused partly by a strength-
ened market power of a consolidated bank in the loan market, which can
be seen by the positive and signiﬁcant change in the loan interest rate three
and ﬁve years after mergers. Though the increase in the loan interest rate
may reﬂect the change in the riskiness of the portfolio, the share of SME
loans, which can be considered to be relatively risky, tended to decrease, if
anything, rather than to increase after mergers. Furthermore, examining
the correlations of the change in the loan interest rate with the Herﬁndahl
Index and with the SME loan share, we ﬁnd that the former is 0.571, while
the latter is 0.243. A relatively high correlation between the change in the
loan interest rate and the Herﬁndahl Index is consistent with the market
power hypothesis. Though there is a possibility that consolidated banks
implemented more stringent risk management, it would be diﬃcult to
charge higher loan rates without a strengthened market power. The
changes in the capital-to-asset ratio are negative up to ﬁve years after merg-
ers, though signiﬁcant only in the ﬁve-year average after mergers. The im-
provement of ROA after the merger was too slow and small to oﬀset the ini-
tial gap of the capital ratios between consolidated banks and their peers.
The advertisement expenses as a proportion of total costs decrease signif-
icantly three and ﬁve years after mergers, which is not consistent with the
managerial empire-building hypothesis.
Dividing the sample period into the precrisis period and the postcrisis
period (the second and third columns, respectively), we see that the
changes in the capital-to-asset ratio are negative for both periods but sig-
niﬁcant only for the postcrisis period, while the change in the fees and com-
missions is positive and signiﬁcant in the postcrisis period (for the 
z-statistics).
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Weighted average Acquirer
1990–2004 1990–1997 1998–2004 1990–2004
Return of assets (ROA)
 ROA (3-year postmerger) –1.869 –1.934
 ROA (5-year postmerger) 0.504b 0.481b
 ROA (postmerger average) –0.471 0.067 –0.793 –0.530
Cost Ratio
 Cost Ratio (3-year postmerger) –0.003 0.021
 Cost Ratio (5-year postmerger) –0.084 –0.045
 Cost Ratio (postmerger average) 0.009 –0.064 0.053 0.021
Fees and Commissions
 Fees and Commissions (3-year postmerger) 0.013 –0.001
 Fees and Commissions (5-year postmerger) –0.003 –0.010
 Fees and Commissions (postmerger average) 0.034 –0.005 0.057∗∗ 0.014
Loan-to-Asset Ratio
 Loan-to-Asset Ratio (3-year postmerger) –2.131 –0.623
 Loan-to-Asset Ratio (5-year postmerger) –3.387 –2.100
 Loan-to-Asset Ratio (postmerger average) –2.163 –2.299 –2.082 –1.303
Loans to SMEs
 Loans to SMEs (3-year postmerger) –1.556 –1.079
 Loans to SMEs (5-year postmerger) –1.320 –0.721
 Loans to SMEs (postmerger average) –0.335 –1.310 0.249 0.415
Loan Growth Rate
 Loan Growth Rate (3-year postmerger) –3.471 –3.587
 Loan Growth Rate (5-year postmerger) –1.928 –2.549
 Loan Growth Rate (postmerger average) –0.846 –0.974 –0.768 –0.818
Deposit Interest Rate
 Deposit Interest Rate (3-year postmerger) –0.010 0.015
 Deposit Interest Rate (5-year postmerger) 0.125 0.143
 Deposit Interest Rate (postmerger average) –0.006 0.025 –0.024 0.023
Loan Interest Rate
 Loan Interest Rate (3-year postmerger) 0.187b 0.269
 Loan Interest Rate (5-year postmerger) 0.177b 0.221
 Loan Interest Rate (postmerger average) 0.069 0.174 0.007 0.178b∗∗
Capital-to-Asset Ratio
 Capital-to-Asset Ratio (3-year postmerger) –0.371 –0.416
 Capital-to-Asset Ratio (5-year postmerger) –0.202 –0.283
 Capital-to-Asset Ratio (postmerger average) –0.892b∗∗ –0.135 –1.347a∗∗ –0.995b∗∗
Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS)
 Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) 
(3-year postmerger)
 Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) 
(5-year postmerger)
 Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) 
(postmerger average) –0.543 –0.543 –0.718
Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL)
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL) 
(3-year postmerger)The last column shows the changes of the performance of a consolidated
bank from the premerger acquirer for the full sample period. The changes
from the premerger acquirer are qualitatively the same as the changes from
the premerger hypothetical combined bank except for the change in the ad-
vertisement expenses from the premerger acquirer, which is negative but
not signiﬁcant.
Shinkin Banks
Table 8.9 shows the changes in the ﬁnancial ratios of the consolidated
shinkin banks for the full sample period. The ﬁrst column shows the
changes from the hypothetical premerger combined bank. Some ﬁnancial
ratios change in similar ways to those of major and regional banks. First,
the changes in ROA are negative three years after mergers and then turn to
positive, though not signiﬁcant. Second, the changes in the loan interest
rate are positive, though not signiﬁcant. The correlation of the change in
the loan interest with the change in the Herﬁndahl Index is positive (0.356)
and signiﬁcant, suggesting that the increase in the loan interest rate, if any,
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 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL) 
(5-year postmerger)
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL) 
(postmerger average) 0.813 0.813 0.870
Nonperforming Loan Ratio (FRL)
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (FRL) 
(3-year postmerger)
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (FRL) 
(5-year postmerger)
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (FRL) 
(postmerger average) 1.478 1.478 0.560
Advertisement Expenses
 Advertisement Expenses (3-year postmerger) –0.353a –0.300
 Advertisement Expenses (5-year postmerger) –0.251b –0.154
 Advertisement Expenses (postmerger average) –0.052 –0.203 0.038 0.064
Asset Growth
 Asset Growth (3-year postmerger) –2.223 –2.018
 Asset Growth (5-year postmerger) –1.652 –2.126
 Asset Growth (postmerger average) 0.242 –0.158 0.482 0.298
Note: See notes to table 8.7.
aSigniﬁcant at the 1 percent level for the null hypothesis that  X (or X) has zero mean.
bSigniﬁcant at the 1 percent level for the null hypothesis that  X (or X) has zero mean.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis the  X (or
X) has median zero.
Table 8.8 (continued)
Weighted average Acquirer
1990–2004 1990–1997 1998–2004 1990–2004Table 8.9 Postmerger performance of Shinkin banks
Weighted average Acquirer
1990–2002 1990–1997 1998–2002 1990–2002
Return of assets (ROA)
 ROA (3-year postmerger) –0.032 –0.047
 ROA (5-year postmerger) 0.107 0.093
 ROA (postmerger average) 0.003 0.064 –0.098 –0.019
Cost Ratio
 Cost Ratio (3-year postmerger) –0.002 –0.011
 Cost Ratio (5-year postmerger) 0.011 –0.014
 Cost Ratio (postmerger average) 0.000 0.018 –0.029 0.000
Fees and Commissions
 Fees and Commissions (3-year postmerger) 0.004 0.003
 Fees and Commissions (5-year postmerger) 0.007 0.005
 Fees and Commissions (postmerger average) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Loan-to-Asset Ratio
 Loan-to-Asset Ratio (3-year postmerger) 0.718 –0.120
 Loan-to-Asset Ratio (5-year postmerger) 1.127 0.186
 Loan-to-Asset Ratio (postmerger average) 0.765 0.328 1.492 0.178
Loan Growth Rate
 Loan Growth Rate (3-year postmerger) –0.916 –1.833a∗∗∗
 Loan Growth Rate (5-year postmerger) –0.971 –2.029b∗∗
 Loan Growth Rate (postmerger average) –0.823 –0.744 –0.956 –1.940a∗∗∗
Deposit Interest Rate
 Deposit Interest Rate (3-year postmerger) 0.037 0.052
 Deposit Interest Rate (5-year postmerger) 0.039 0.064
 Deposit Interest Rate (postmerger average) 0.022 0.049 –0.021 0.029
Loan Interest Rate
 Loan Interest Rate (3-year postmerger) 0.084 0.052
 Loan Interest Rate (5-year postmerger) 0.088 0.045
 Loan Interest Rate (postmerger average) 0.062 0.079 0.033 0.040
Capital-to-Asset Ratio
 Capital-to-Asset Ratio (3-year postmerger) –0.547b∗∗ –0.659a∗∗∗
 Capital-to-Asset Ratio (5-year postmerger) –0.476 –0.551
 Capital-to-Asset Ratio (postmerger average) –0.510a∗∗∗ –0.487b∗∗ –0.548a∗∗∗ –0.625a∗∗∗
Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS)
 Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) 
(3-year postmerger) –1.508 –1.801b∗∗
 Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) 
(5-year postmerger) –3.331b –3.354b
 Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) 
(postmerger average) –0.969a∗∗∗ –1.820 –0.733a∗∗∗ –1.311a∗∗∗
Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL)
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL) 
(3-year postmerger) 0.697 1.565
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL) 
(5-year postmerger) 0.842 1.338
 Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL) 
(postmerger average) 0.625 0.094 0.782 1.426b∗∗may be caused by a strengthened market power. Third, the capital-to-asset
ratio and the risk-based capital ratio (BIS) are both negative and signiﬁ-
cant for most of the postmerger years. Fourth, the changes in the asset
growth rate are negative and signiﬁcant ﬁve years after mergers.
The second and third columns show the results for the precrisis and post-
crisis periods, respectively. The changes in the capital-to-asset ratios and
the asset growth rate are negative and signiﬁcant in both periods, while the
change in the risk-based capital ratio is negative in both periods but sig-
niﬁcant only in the postcrisis period.
The last column shows the changes in the ﬁnancial ratios of a consoli-
dated bank from the premerger acquirer. The changes in the capital-to-
asset ratio, the risk-based capital ratio, and the asset growth rate are simi-
lar to the changes from the hypothetical combined bank, while the changes
in the loan growth rates are negative and signiﬁcant up to ﬁve years after
M&As, and the change in the nonperforming loan ratio is positive and sig-
niﬁcant for the ﬁve-year postmerger average.
We may summarize the postmerger performance of consolidated banks
as follows. First, consolidated banks tended to go through a decline in
ROA at ﬁrst and then to increase ROA about ﬁve years after mergers,
though this recovery was signiﬁcant only for the mergers of regional banks.
It seems to take considerable time and cost to integrate diﬀerent informa-
tion systems and other business methods. Second, in the case of the M&As
by regional banks or shinkin banks, consolidated banks tended to raise in-
terest rates on loans, though this is signiﬁcant only for the mergers by re-
gional banks, suggesting that their market power was strengthened within
the prefecture they operated in. This is consistent with the U.S. evidence,
showing that in-market consolidation strengthens market power. Third,
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Asset Growth
 Asset Growth (3-year postmerger) –1.070 –1.358b∗∗
 Asset Growth (5-year postmerger) –1.844b∗∗ –2.011a∗∗
 Asset Growth (postmerger average) –1.904a∗∗∗ –1.462b∗∗ –2.640a∗∗∗ –2.543a∗∗∗
Note: See notes to table 8.7.
aSigniﬁcant at the 1 percent level for the null hypothesis that  X (or X) has zero mean.
bSigniﬁcant at the 1 percent level for the null hypothesis that  X (or X) has zero mean.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis the  X (or
X) has median zero.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis the  X (or
X) has median zero.
Table 8.9 (continued)
Weighted average Acquirer
1990–2002 1990–1997 1998–2002 1990–2002the changes in services provided are diﬀerent by bank type and by period.
Consolidated major banks tended to expand SME loans in the precrisis pe-
riod, while consolidated regional banks tended to expand fees and com-
missions business in the postcrisis period. Fourth, consolidated banks did
not recover bank health after mergers. The capital-to-asset ratio tended to
decrease rather than to increase regardless of bank type. The recovery of
ROA was too slow and small to ﬁll in the initial gap of the capital-asset-
ratio between consolidated banks and their peers. In addition, consoli-
dated banks did not decrease nonperforming loans. Finally, consolidated
banks tended to decelerate the loan growth rate and the asset growth rate,
suggesting that consolidated banks tried to restructure assets and to down-
size. Consolidated banks did not increase the advertisement expenses. The
managerial empire-building hypothesis does not seem to be valid in Japan.
8.8 Conclusion
The recent waves of M&As in the banking industries across the world
raise important questions of whether mergers enhance the eﬃciency of
consolidated banks and contribute to the stabilization of the banking sec-
tor. We investigate the motives and consequences of the consolidation of
banks in Japan during the period of ﬁscal year 1990 to ﬁscal year 2004. In
particular, we test the four hypotheses concerning the motives for bank
mergers: eﬃciency improving, strengthening market power, taking advan-
tage of a too-big-to-fail policy, and managerial empire building.
We ﬁrst investigated the reasons for the recent merger wave using the ag-
gregate data at the prefecture level. Our results suggest that M&As tended
to occur when the overall bank health was deteriorated and where the mar-
ket was less concentrated. These results are consistent with the too-big-to-
fail or stabilization policy hypothesis and the market power hypothesis, re-
spectively.
Our analysis concerning the relationship between ex-ante bank charac-
teristics and the decision of M&As suggests the following. First, in the
postcrisis period (1998 to 2004), eﬃcient banks tended to acquire an in-
eﬃcient bank except for the M&As of corporative (shinkin) banks. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the eﬃciency-improving hypothesis. Second, un-
healthy banks tended to be consolidated with each other, especially in the
postcrisis period, which is consistent with the too-big-to-fail policy or sta-
bilization policy hypothesis.
Our investigation of postmerger performance suggests the following.
First, consolidated banks tended to go through a decline in ROA at ﬁrst
and then to increase ROA about ﬁve years after mergers, though these
changes are not necessarily signiﬁcant. Second, in-market consolidation
enabled consolidated banks to raise the loan interest rate. Third, consoli-
dated banks tended to decrease the capital-to-asset ratio and not to de-
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strain loan and asset growths and not to increase advertisement expenses.
In sum, our analysis suggests that the government’s too-big-to-fail pol-
icy or its attempt at stabilizing the local ﬁnancial market through consol-
idations played an important role in the M&As, though its attempt does
not seem to have been successful. The eﬃciency-improving motive also
seems to have driven the M&As conducted by major banks and regional
banks in the postcrisis period, while the market-power motive seems to
have driven the M&As conducted by regional banks and corporative
(shinkin) banks. We obtain no evidence that supports managerial motives
for empire building.
Japanese banking industries are still in the midst of an ongoing merger
wave. Future research incorporating new data that will be available in com-
ing years would help us fully understand its eventual consequences.
Data Appendix
•R O A     Current Proﬁt/Total Asset   100
• Cost Ratio   (Personnel Expenditure   Nonpersonnel Expenditure
  Taxes)/Total Asset   100
• Fees and Commisions   Fees and Commisions/Total Asset   100
• Loan-to-Asset Ratio   Loans Outstanding/Total Asset   100
• Loans to SMEs   Loans to SMEs/Total Asset   100
• Loan Growth Rate   Growth Rate of Loans Outstanding   100
• Deposit Interest Rate   Interest on Deposits/Deposits Outstanding 
  100
• Loan Interest Rate   Interest on Loans/Loans Outstanding   100
• Capital-to-Asset Ratio   Equity Capital/Total Asset   100
• Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS)   Regulatory Capital/Risk Asset 
  100 (Based on BIS)
• Nonperforming Loan Ratio (BL)   Nonperforming Loan Based on
Banking Law/Total Asset   100
• Nonperforming Loan Ratio (FRL)  Nonperforming Loan Based on
Financial Revitalization Law/Total Asset   100
• Ln Asset   ln(Total Asset)
• Asset Growth   Growth Rate of Total Asset   100
• Herﬁndahl Index   Prefectural Herﬁndahl Index (calculated by de-
posits outstanding of regional and shinkin banks)
• GDP Growth   Growth Rate of GDP   100
• Stock Price   Growth Rate of the Stock Price   100
• Industrial Stock Price   Growth Rate of the Stock Price Index of
banking industry   100
Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Causes and Consequences 307• Advertisement Expenses   Advertisement Expenses/Operating Cost
  100
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Comment Hiro Ito
Before the 1990s, bank mergers were hardly seen in Japan except for a very
few cases of rescue mergers. Even those rare mergers were initiated by the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) with help of keiretsu-related companies and
banks of the rescued bank. At present, bank merger is no longer uncom-
mon in Japan. In retrospect, two events led to a signiﬁcant increase in bank
mergers in Japan. One is a series of deregulation/liberalization policies in
the ﬁnancial sector that started in the early 1980s, and the other is the 1990s
recession.
Deregulation/liberalization policies contributed to thinning proﬁt mar-
gins, which used to be guaranteed by the government through ﬁnancially
repressive policies, and thereby intensifying market competitions for the ﬁ-
nancial institutions. The recession that started in 1991 hurt ﬁnancial insti-
tutions’ balance sheets through severe asset deﬂation and weakened loan
demand. Inevitably, in the early 1990s, merging with other institutions
started to be viewed as one of the means to survive the severe conditions in
the Japanese ﬁnancial industry. In the aftermath of the banking crisis of
1998, which broke out with several major bank failures, as the Japanese
banking industry became ﬂuid, so did the number of bank mergers drasti-
cally increase.
With this background, this chapter investigates a fundamental question
pertaining to banking consolidations in Japan: “What motivates banks to
decide to merge?” More speciﬁcally, the authors investigate whether banks
decide to merge so as (1) to increase market power; (2) to improve cost eﬃ-
ciency; (3) to merely follow government’s ﬁnancial stabilization policy; or
(4) to build a managerial empire. The authors categorize the ﬁrst two views
as the “value maximization view” because these two consequences can
lead to increasing the value of shares and the last two as the ﬁnancial sta-
bilization view and the managerial empire building view.1
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1. As Andy Rose pointed out at the presentation, I also agree that points one and two
should not be considered to be one view. Although both of the two points may lead to in-